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Iraq repercussions trouble top advisers by John Walcott, San Jose Mercury-News May 31, 2003 WASHINGTON "The postwar period in Iraq is messy. We haven't found what we said we'd find there and there are unpleasant questions about assumptions we made and intelligence we had," said a senior national security official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "If many more months go by and our troops are still there, the Iraqis are still fighting each other and us, and we still haven't found any WMD" The situation in Iraq could rebound quickly, especially if U.S. forces restore power, water, health care and other services; revive the nation's battered oil industry; and unite feuding Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis and tribes into some sort of civil authority. But for now, U.S. troops in Iraq are the targets of anger and ambushes instead of being greeted as liberators, as some Pentagon officials had expected. Eleven Americans died this week from enemy action and accidents, and some of their civilian leaders now privately admit that the relatively small force that quickly overwhelmed the Iraqi military is too small to restore order in a nation the size of California. The U.S. attempt to hand the country over to an Iraqi civilian administration isn't faring much better, and Bush is expected to meet with L. Paul Bremer, the top U.S. civilian in Iraq, in Qatar on Wednesday to discuss overhauling the American administration in Baghdad for the second time in a month. A top U.S. official Friday said Bremer's predecessor, retired Army Gen. Jay Garner, had failed, adding: "We lost a month because of Garner." Critics in Congress and some within the government now suspect that a third problem, potentially the most serious of all, helps to explain the unexpected difficulties. Much of the administration's public rationale for the war, and much of its planning for the war and its aftermath, these critics say, appears to have been based on fabricated or exaggerated intelligence that was fed to civilian officials in the Pentagon by Iraqi exiles eager for the United States to oust Saddam Hussein. The exiles, intelligence officials said, told Pentagon officials, among other things, that many Iraqi Shiites would welcome American troops as liberators, that some key Iraqi generals would surrender their units and that Saddam had sent a key operative to work with a small Islamist group, Ansar al-Islam, that had ties to Al-Qaida. Officials in the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department all warned repeatedly that past experience with the exiles, led by Ahmed Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress, indicated that their intelligence was unreliable at best. But the intelligence information and Iraqi defectors supplied by the Iraqi National Congress were taken seriously in two important places: the New York Times and a special intelligence group set up by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. The Iraqi National Congress, U.S. intelligence officials said, bypassed skeptics in the CIA and DIA and fed the same information about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and links to Al-Qaida to the Times and the Pentagon, so Pentagon officials would confirm what the nation's most influential newspaper was hearing and the newspaper would confirm what the Pentagon was hearing. An internal Times e-mail reported by the Washington Post said Chalabi "has provided most of the front-page exclusives on WMD to our paper" and added that a team of U.S. troops searching for chemical and biological weapons in Iraq was "using Chalabi's intel [intelligence] and document network for its own WMD work." Doubts about the administration's assertions that Saddam had hidden stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and established ties to Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida terrorist organization have been growing almost daily since the war ended, as U.S. troops have failed to find either the weapons or ties to terrorism. The senior Marine general in Iraq said Friday that extensive searches had failed to locate any chemical weapons. "It was a surprise to me then "Believe me, it's not for lack of trying. We've been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, but they're simply not there," Conway said. Bush, however, told a Polish television network: "We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories ... and we'll find more weapons as time goes on. But for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, we found them." CIA officials Wednesday said U.S. troops in Iraq had found two mobile laboratories that analysts concluded were intended to make biological weapons, but they said the labs contained no evidence that the Iraqis had actually produced such weapons. In an interview in the upcoming issue of Vanity Fair magazine, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, a leading proponent of the war, cast some doubt on whether administration officials were convinced that Iraq had secret stocks of nerve gas and anthrax bacteria, or whether they merely seized on the issue as a way to build support for the war. "The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason," Wolfowitz said, according to a text released by the Pentagon. Another senior official, who agreed to speak only on the condition of anonymity, said Wolfowitz's remark was accurate: CIA and State Department analysts, he said, sharply disputed the Pentagon's claim that Saddam had forged links to Al-Qaida, but everyone agreed that Iraq probably had not destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons. However, the official said Wolfowitz's "choice of words, if it's being reported accurately, is probably one that Paul now regrets." Another top official, who also agreed to speak only without attribution because, he said, "talking out of school is frowned upon at the White House," said White House political director Karl Rove and other officials were displeased by the report of Wolfowitz's remarks because they feared it would undermine public support for the war. In Europe, the account of Wolfowitz's remarks revived suspicions that the administration had deliberately misled the world about Iraq. Meanwhile, Bush was headed to Poland, Russia and an economic summit meeting in France. "The charge of deception is inescapable," said Germany's largest newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. San Jose Mercury-News
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3 : ABSURD (an insane scheme for making money) in·san·i·ty n. 1 a : a deranged state of the mind usually occurring as a specific disorder (as schizophrenia) and usually excluding such states as mental retardation, psychoneurosis, and various character disorders b : a mental disorder 2 : such unsoundness of mind or lack of understanding as prevents one from having the mental capacity required by law to enter into a particular relationship, status, or transaction or as removes one from criminal or civil responsibility 3 a : extreme folly or unreasonableness b : something utterly foolish or unreasonable
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